Mandate

Klarman 1991 Interview with Barron's

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This 1991 Barron's interview with Seth Klarman offers some intriguing insights into how Baupost got its start, and the nature of Klarman’s initial client base and business structure. Baupost currently manages ~$32 Billion AUM (per latest firm ADV), whereas ~24 years ago that figure stood at $400mm, and ~33 years ago only $27mm. Time + compounding + inflows can lead to staggering absolute sums. Clients

“My first real education in investing came when I took a summer job in my junior year at college with Max Heine and Mike Price at Mutual Shares. They invited me back to join them in January of '79. I worked there about 20 months until I left for business school. Just before graduation, I was offered the opportunity to join with several individuals who had decided to pool their assets and helped to form the Baupost Group to steward those assets. That was 9 1/2 years ago…These people are all still involved. They were never active day to day…They are wonderful partners…They are on the board of the company. They are partial owners of the company. And each of them has all of his liquid investable assets here, as do all the principals, all the people who run the money.”

“We set out at the beginning to be somewhat unconventional, with our clients acting as board members and as part owners. The incentive really was to do whatever it took to maximize the return on their money, not necessarily to grow a profitable business. Along the way, some decisions were made, including one to turn down most of the people who tried to become clients. We actually closed for new clients about five years ago. And we have grown from compounding ever since…over the years we have grown through word of mouth. In the earlier years, we grew beyond the initial three families, for a couple of reasons. One was that they had some friends who liked the idea of what we were trying to do and wanted to come in. They are the kind of people who say yes to friends. And also partly because we didn't want to be overly dependent on any one person for the success of our business going forward…There were the three families and I had a partner who was a part-time person who focused primarily on administrative matters… The compound return to investors after our profit-sharing arrangement has been 20%-25% in the limited partnerships…over the 8 3/4 years the partnerships have been in existence.”

“They correctly perceived that they could spend a lot of their time clipping coupons, collecting dividends, making sure that all the numbers were right. And it could become, if not a full-time job, at least one that consumed a substantial amount of their time. And these were the kind of people who didn't want to spend all their time just counting their money and paying attention to such details. So they pooled it to form Baupost.”

“We are blessed with a client base that is not short-term-oriented. I don't think any money manager knows how deep the reservoir of client goodwill is.”

Maximizing performance returns and building a profitable investment management business are not necessarily mutually inclusive objectives. The latter often requires quick AUM ramp. This is why seed investor arrangements can lead to potential conflicts.

Klarman and his capital partners first defined the goal and alignment of interest (usually the hardest part). The rest was structuring and execution. Baupost wasn’t conventional or unconventional, simply a solution to their circumstance and situation.

AUM

“Q: How much money do you manage? A: A little bit over $400 million. Q: And how much did you start with 10 years ago? A: $27 million.”

“Q: …Can we take it you stopped accepting new money because you think there is only a certain amount of money you can efficiently manage? A: That is a fair way to put it. There are dis-economies of scale in terms of the returns that can be earned on managed money. That probably kicks in a lot smaller than we are. It probably kicks in at $50 million or $100 million. But over the realm of all possible sizes, you just don't want to get beyond a certain level, particularly when you have an eclectic strategy like ours. There is only so much that you can buy that fits our kind of criteria. And we are comfortable at our current size. Q: So this is pretty much a matter of feel? A: That's right. I think we also want to stay small because it is frankly more fun. We enjoy the camaraderie of being a small firm with everybody doing work, and everybody understanding pretty much where we are going. The last thing I want to be is manager of a staff of a dozen analysts and portfolio managers. I wouldn't like that at all.”

Um, that obviously changed. A friend recently commented that all successful investors must eventually learn to manage larger amounts of capital. Why? Even without large inflows, compounding alone will force you into ever larger realms of AUM.

Mandate

“Q: Is this institutional money you're managing? A: All individual money. Q: It's really unusual to have that much individual money…”

“Q: Do you call yourself a hedge fund? A: No. We do not. We are compensated somewhat like hedge funds but do not hedge in the sense of always being long and short. We tend to be long investors. We are rarely on the short side.”

It’s okay to admit that you’re not a “hedge fund”…

“…perhaps most important, we are not just focusing on equities. We focus on any security of a company that is mispriced. We can even find some companies where one security, like the equity, is overvalued, but where another security, like the debt, might be undervalued. We have flexibility in our partnership agreement to do pretty much anything we like. Right now, and for the better part of the last two years, much of our investment has been in the senior securities of overleveraged companies.”

It puzzles me when people fixate on Baupost’s 13F (the latest discloses $5.9Bn worth of public equity assets). This is only ~18% of the firm’s total AUM. The remaining 82% is invested elsewhere included private real estate & bankruptcy workouts (such as a large position in Lehman).

“If you are asking, ‘Is there more competition in many of the areas that we are looking at?’ that is absolutely true. The good news is that first of all, we are flexible enough to not be committed in any single area. Take, for example, distressed securities. In 1985, as far as we can remember there was only one firm doing research in dis tress. That was R.D. Smith. In 1991, we check our faxes and our research reports, and we count 44 firms doing work in that area…So there is no question that there's now a crowd. The research coverage and Wall Street's attention to it have increased probably more than the considerable proliferation of opportunities in that area. So we have more competition. But we have flexibility, we also have patience. These people have special-purpose funds to do whatever it is they are doing, to do distressed securities, to do LBOs, whatever their funds are looking for. And when opportunities cease to exist, they will probably distribute the funds and go out of business. Already, we see many of the arbitrageurs from the 'Eighties disappear and go into new lines of business like distressed securities.”

Mandate flexibility provides a competitive advantage. Investing is a fiercely competitive. Why make your life harder by limiting where you may seek returns? Klarman may have lots of institutional capital today, but it didn’t start off that way. An institutional capital base may/will constrain the type of investments you can or can’t make.

 

Howard Marks' Book: Chapter 12

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Continuation of portfolio management highlights from Howard Marks’ book, The Most Important Thing: Uncommon Sense for the Thoughtful Investor, Chapter 12 “The Most Important Thing Is…Finding Bargains” Definition of Investing, Portfolio Management, Position Review, Intrinsic Value, Opportunity Cost

“…‘investment is the discipline of relative selection.’” Quoting Sidney Cottle, a former editor of Graham and Dodd’s Security Analysis.

The process of intelligently building a portfolio consists of buying the best investments, making room for them by selling lesser ones, and staying clear of the worst. The raw materials for the process consist of (a) a list of potential investments, (b) estimates of their intrinsic value, (c) a sense for how their prices compare with their intrinsic value, and (d) an understanding of the risk involved in each, and of the effect their inclusion would have on the portfolio being assembled.

The “process of intelligently building a portfolio” doesn’t end with identifying investments, and calculating their intrinsic values and potential risks. It also requires choosing between available opportunities (because we can’t invest in everything) and anticipating the impact of inclusion upon the resulting combined portfolio of investments. Additionally, there’s the continuous monitoring of portfolio positions – comparing and contrasting between existing and potential investments, sometimes having to make room for new/better investments by “selling the lesser ones.”

It’s worthwhile to point out that intrinsic value is important not only because it tells you when to buy or sell a particular asset, but also because it serves as a way to compare & contrast between available opportunities. Intrinsic value is yet another input into the ever complicated “calculation” for opportunity cost.

Mandate, Risk

“Not only can there be risks investors don’t want to take, but also there can be risks their clients don’t want them to take. Especially in the institutional world, managers are rarely told ‘Here’s my money; do what you want with it.’”

This type of risk avoidance is a form of structural inefficiency caused by mandate restrictions. It creates opportunities for those willing to accept that particular risk and/or don’t have mandate restrictions. A great example: very few investors owned financials in 2009-2010. Fear of the “blackhole” balance sheet was only a partial explanation. During that period, I heard anecdotally that although some institutional fund managers believed the low price more than compensated for the balance sheet risk, they merely didn’t want to have to explain owning financials to their clients.

Pyschology

“…the optimism that drives one to be an active investor and the skepticism that emerges from the presumption of market efficiency must be balanced.”

 

 

Wisdom from Peter Lynch

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Previously, we summarized an interview with Michael F. Price & an interview with David E. Shaw from Peter J. Tanous’ book Investment Gurus. Below are highlight from yet another fantastic interview, this time with Peter Lynch, the legendary investor who ran Fidelity's Magellan Fund from 1977-1990, compounding at ~30% annually during that period.

When To Buy, Volatility, Catalyst

On technical buy indicators, expected volatility, and catalysts:

“I have traditionally liked a certain formation. It’s what I call the electrocardiogram of a rock. The goes from, say, 50 to 8. It has an incredible crater. Then it goes sideways for a few years between 8 and 11. That’s why I call it the EKG of a rock. It’s never changing. Now you know if something goes right with this company, the stock is going north. In reality, it’s probably just going to go sideways forever. So if you’re right it goes north and if you’re wrong it goes sideways. These stocks make for a nice research list…stocks that have bottomed out...

...When it’s going from 50 to 8, it looks cheap at 15; it looks cheap at 12. So you want the knife to stick in the wood. When it stops vibrating, then you can pick it up. That’s how I see it on a purely technical basis…why the stock is on your research list, not on your buy list. You investigate and you find that of these ten stories, this one has something going on. They’re getting rid of a losing division, one of their competitors is going under, or something else.”

When To Buy

“You could have bought Wal-Mart ten years after it went public…it was a twenty-year-old company. This was not a startup…You could have bought Wal-Mart and made 30 times your money. If you bought it the day it went public you would have made 500 times your money. But you could have made 30 times your money ten years after it went public.”

Many value investors experience difficulty buying assets when prices are moving upward. At those moments, perhaps it’s important to remember to see the forest (ultimate risk-reward) through the trees (an upward moving price).

Expected Return, Fat Tail

“There may be only a few times a decade when you make a lot of money. How many times in your lifetime are you going to make five times on your money?”

I hear chatter about “lotto ticket” and “asymmetric risk-reward” ideas all the time. A friend recently joked that he would rather buy actual lotto tickets than the lotto-ticket-ideas because with the former he actually stands a chance of hitting the jackpot.

Apparently, Peter Lynch sort of agrees with my friend. Markets are generally efficient enough that asymmetric risk-reward opportunities rarely occur. The tricky part is discerning between the real deal vs. imitations conjured from misjudgment or wishful thinking analysis.

Diversification, Correlation

“If you buy ten emerging growth funds and all these companies have small sales and are very volatile companies, buying ten of those is not diversification.”

The correlation between assets, not the number of assets, ultimately determines the level of diversification within a portfolio.

Clients

“One out of every hundred Americans was in my fund…For many of these people, $5,000 is half their assets other than their house. And there are people you meet who say we sent our kids to college, or we paid off the mortgage. What I’m saying is that it’s very rewarding to have a fund where you really made a difference in a lot of people’s lives.”

How refreshing. Those who work in the investment management world sometimes forget for whom they toil (beyond numero uno). A job well done could potentially make large positive impacts on the lives of others.

Team Management

On how he’s spending his time after stepping down from managing the Magellan Fund:

“…I work with young analysts. We bring in six new ones a year and I work with them one-on-one.”

Process Over Outcome

On whether Peter Lynch would have pursued an investment career had he lost money in his first stock purchase:

“Well, I guess if I’d lost money over and over again then maybe I would have gone into another field.”

Only in the long-run is outcome indicative of skill.

Mandate

“…I was always upset by the fact that they called Magellan a growth fund. I think that is a mistake. If you pigeonhole somebody and all they can buy are the best available growth companies, what happens if all the grow companies are overpriced? You end up buying the least overpriced ones.”

 

 

Munger Wisdom: 2013 Daily Journal Meeting

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Below are my personal notes (portfolio management highlights) from Charlie Munger’s Q&A Session during the 2013 Daily Journal Shareholders Meeting this Wednesday in Los Angeles. Opportunity Cost

After the meeting, I approached Munger to ask him about his thoughts on opportunity cost (a topic that he mentioned numerous times while answering questions, and in previous lectures and speeches).

His response: “Everyone should be thinking about opportunity cost all the time.”

During the Q&A session, Munger gave two investment examples in which he cites opportunity cost.

Bellridge Oil: During the the Wheeler-Munger partnership days, a broker called to offer him 300 shares of Bellridge Oil (trading at 20% of asset liquidation value). He purchased the shares. Soon after, the broker called again to offer him 1500 more shares. Munger didn’t readily have cash available to make the purchase and would have had to (1) sell another position to raise cash, or (2) use leverage. He didn’t want to do either and declined the shares. A year and a half later, Bellridge Oil sold for 35x the price at which the broker offered him the shares. This missed profit could have been rolled into Berkshire Hathaway.

Boston-based shoe supplier to JCPenney: One of the worst investments Berkshire made, for which they gave away 2% of Berkshire stock and received a worthless asset in return.

For both examples, opportunity cost was considered in the context of what "could have been" when combined with the capital compounding that transpired at Berkshire.

Making Mistakes, Liquidity

DRC (Diversified Retailing Company) was purchased by Munger & Buffett in the 1960s with a small bank loan and $6 million of equity. Munger owned 10% so contributed $600,000. But as soon as the ink dried on the contract, they realized that it wasn’t all that great a business due to “ghastly competition.” Their solution? Scrambled to get out as FAST as possible.

Related to this, be sure to read Stanley Druckenmiller’s thoughts on making mistakes and its relationship to trading liquidity (two separate articles).

Generally, humans are bad at admitting our mistakes, which then leads to delay and inaction, which is not ideal. Notice Druckenmiller and Munger come from completely different schools of investment philosophies, yet they deal with mistakes the exact same way – quickly – to allow them to fight another day. Liquidity just happens to make this process easier.

Another Munger quote related to mistakes: “People want hope.” Don’t ever let hope become your primary investment thesis.

“Treat success and failures just the same.” Be sure to “review stupidity,” but remember that it’s “perfectly normal to fail.”

Leverage

Munger told story about press expansion – newspapers paying huge sums for other newspapers – relying largely on leverage given the thesis of regional market-share monopolies. Unfortunately, with technology, the monopolies thesis disintegrated, and the leverage a deathblow.

Perhaps the lesson here is that leverage is most dangerous when coupled with a belief in the continuation of historical status quo.

Luck, Creativity

The masterplan doesn’t always work. Some of life’s success stories derive from situations of people reacting intelligently to opportunities, fixing problems as they emerge, or better yet:

“Playing the big bass tuba in an open field when it happened to rain gold.”

 

 

 

 

 

Turnover

Munger’s personal account had zero transactions in 2012.

Psychology

On the decline of the General Motors: “prosperity made them weak.”

This is a lesson in hubris, and associated behavioral biases, that's definitely applicable to investment management. Investing, perhaps even more so than most businesses, is fiercely competitive. In this zero sum game, the moment we rest on the laurels of past performance success, and become overconfident etc., is the moment future performance decline begins.

Always be aware, and resist behavior slithering in that dangerous direction.

Mandate

Berkshire had “two reasonable options” to deploy capital, into both public and private markets. Munger doesn’t understand why Berkshire’s model hasn’t been copied more often. It makes sense to have a flexible hybrid mandate (or structure) which allows for deployment of capital into wherever assets are most attractive or cheapest.

Clients, Time Management

Most people are too competitive – they want ALL business available, and sometimes end up doing things that are "morally beneath them," and/or abandon personal standards. Plus, general happiness should be a consideration as well.

The smartest people figure out what business they don’t want and avoid all together – which leads to foregoing some degree of business and profit – that’s absolutely okay. This is what he and Buffett have figured out and tried to do over time.

On doing what’s right: He and Buffett fulfill their fiduciary duty in that they “wanted people who we barely know who happen to buy the stock to do well.” Munger doesn’t think there are that many people in the corporate world who subscribe to this approach today.

 

 

Baupost Letters: 1997

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Continuation in our series on portfolio management and Seth Klarman, with ideas extracted from old Baupost Group letters. Our Readers know that we generally provide excerpts along with commentary for each topic. However, at the request of Baupost, we will not be providing any excerpts, only our interpretive summaries, for this series.

Mandate, Trackrecord, Expected Return

For the past several years, Klarman had invested heavily into Baupost’s international efforts/infrastructure because he believed that opportunities in the U.S. marketplace were less attractive than those found abroad, due to increased competition and higher market valuations.

Did Baupost’s flexible investment mandate give it an advantage in trackrecord creation and return generation?

For example, a healthcare fund cannot start investing in utilities because the latter provides better risk-reward, whereas Baupost can invest wherever risk-reward is most attractive.

The trackrecord creation and return generation possibilities for those with more restrictive mandates are bound by the opportunities available within the mandate scope. Baupost, on the other hand, has the freedom to roam to wherever pastures are greenest.

Cash, Expected Return, Risk Free Rate

In the category of largest gains, there was a $2.2MM gain for “Yield on Cash and Cash Equivalents” which at the end of Fiscal Year 1997 (October 31, 1997) consisted of $39MM or 25.5% of NAV.

In 1997, cash earned 5-6% ($2.2MM divided by $39MM) annually, in drastic contrast to virtually nothing today. I point this out as a reminder that historically, and perhaps one day in the future, cash does not always yield zero. In fact, cash interest rates are often highest during bull markets when it’s most prudent to keep a higher cash balance as asset values increase.

For those who fear the performance drag from portfolio cash balances, or those who feel the pressure to “chase” yield in order to boost portfolio returns, this serves as a reminder that cash returns are not static throughout the course of a market cycle.

Hedging, Cash

At 10/31/97, value of “Market Hedges” was $2.0MM, or 1.4% of NAV. Hedges were also the source of his second largest loss that year, declining $2.1MM in value.

That’s a whole lot of premium bleed worth $2.0MM or ~1.5% of NAV! Interestingly, this is almost the exact gain from portfolio cash yields (see above). Coincidence?

If you believe that the phenomenon of the last 20 years will continue to hold – that interest rates will increase as the underlying economy recovers and equity markets move higher, then one can roughly use interest rates (and consequently portfolio cash yields) as a proxy to determine how much hedging premium to spend.

Theoretically, this should be a self-rebalancing process: higher cash yields in bull equity markets = more hedging premium to spend (when you need it most) vs. lower cash yields in bear equity markets = less hedging premium to spend (when you need it least).

Cash, Opportunity Cost

Klarman comments that cash provides protection in turbulent times and ammunition to take advantage of newly created opportunities, but the act of holding cash involves considerable opportunity cost in the form of foregoing attractive investments in the interim – but investors must keep in mind they cannot earn investment returns without actually investing.

After a temporary hiccup in the markets, Klarman discusses portfolio repositioning: adding to some positions while reducing or deleting others, to take advantage of the shifts in the market landscape.

It’s a delicate balance determining when to deploy capital, and when to hold it in the form of cash. You can’t run an investment management business holding cash forever – that would make you a checking account with extremely high fees.

The second point serves as an excellent reminder that the “opportunity cost” calculation involves not only the comparison between cash and a potential investment, but also between a potential investment and current portfolio holdings.

Derivatives, Leverage

Klarman held a wide variety of options and swaps in his portfolio, such as SK Telecom equity & swaps, Kookmin Bank equity and swaps, etc.

In Klarman’s writings, you’ll generally find warnings against using leverage, and equity swaps definitely constitute leverage. I wonder if the derivative swaps were a product of his interest in emerging markets. For example, perhaps Baupost was not able to trade directly in certain markets, and therefore utilized swaps to gain exposure through a counterparty authorized to trade in those countries.

When To Buy

In a market downturn, momentum investors cannot find momentum, growth investors worry about a slowdown, and technical analysts don’t like their charts.

In extreme market downside events, patterns & trends in liquidity, trading volume, sales growth, etc. – that may have existed for years – disintegrate. Therefore, investors who rely on those patterns and trends become disoriented, which then fuels and reinforces more market chaos. This is what we witnessed in 2008-2009, and the time for fundamental investors, and those with intuition and foresight, to shine.

Capital Preservation, Compounding,

Over time, by again and again avoiding loss, you have taken the first step toward achieving healthy gains.

Volatility

Toward the end of the December 1997 letter, Klarman praises his team of analysts and traders who, like himself, hate to lose money, even temporarily, for any reason at any time.

So let it be written! Klarman acknowledges that he doesn’t like to lose money, even temporarily in the form of volatility. 

 

Baupost Letters: 1996

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Continuation in our series on portfolio management and Seth Klarman, with ideas extracted from old Baupost Group letters. Our Readers know that we generally provide excerpts along with commentary for each topic. However, at the request of Baupost, we will not be providing any excerpts, only our interpretive summaries, for this series.

Risk, Sizing, Diversification, Psychology

In 1996, Baupost had a number of investments in the former Soviet Union. Klarman managed the higher level of risk of these investments by limiting position sizing such that if the total investment went to zero, it would not have a materially adverse impact on the future of the fund.

“Unfamiliarity” is a risk for any new investment. Klarman approaches new investments timidly to ensure that there isn’t anything that he’s missing. He does so by controlling sizing and sometimes diversifying across a number of securities within the same opportunity set.

Baupost mitigates risk (partially) by:

  • Sizing slowly and diversifying with basket approach (at least initially)
  • Balancing arrogance with humility. Always be aware of why an investment is available at a bargain price, and your opinion vs. the market. Investing is a zero-sum game, and each time you make a purchase, you’re effectively saying the seller is wrong.

Reading in between the lines, the Russian investments must have held incredibly high payoff potential (in order to justify the amount of time and effort spent on diligence). Smaller position sizing may decrease risk but it also decreases the potential return contribution to the overall portfolio.

Interestingly, this method of balancing risk and return through position sizing and diversification is more akin to venture capital than the traditional value school. For example, recently, investors have been buzzing about a number of Klarman’s biotech equity positions (found on his 13F filing). I’ve heard through the grapevine that these investments were structured like a venture portfolio – the expectation is that some may crash to zero, while some may return many multiples the original investment. Therefore, those copying Klarman’s purchases should proceed with caution, especially given Klarman’s history of making private investments not disclosed on 13F filings.

Diversification

Klarman believes in sufficient but not excessive diversification.

This may explain the rationale behind why Klarman has been known to purchase baskets of individual securities for the same underlying bet – see venture portfolio discussion above.

Correlation, Risk

Always cognizant of whether seemingly different investments are actually the same bet to avoid risk of concentrated exposures.

Mandate, Trackrecord

Baupost has a flexible investment mandate, to go anywhere across asset classes, capital structure, geographies, etc., which allows it to differentiate from the investment fund masses. Opportunities in different markets happen at different times, key is to remain adaptive and ready for opportunity sets when they become available.

The flexible mandate is helpful in smoothing the return stream of the portfolio, and consequently, the trackrecord. Baupost can deploy capital to where opportunities are available in the marketplace, therefore ensuring a (theoretically) steadier stream of future return potential. This is in contrast to funds that cannot take advantage of opportunities outside of their limited mandate zones.

Liquidity

Klarman is willing to accept illiquidity for incremental return.

This makes total sense, but the tricky part is matching portfolio sources (client time horizon, level of patience, and fund redemption terms) with uses (liquidity profile of investments). Illiquidity should not be accept lightly, and has been known to cause problems for even the most savvy of investors (for example: see 2003 NYTimes article on how illiquidity almost destroyed Bill Ackman & David Berkowitz in the early stages of their careers).

Patience

For international exposure [Russia], Baupost spent 7 years immersed in research, studying markets, meeting with managements, making toe-hold investments to observe, hired additional members of investment team (sent a few analysts to former Soviet Union, on the ground, for several months) to network & build foreign sell-side & counterparty relationships.

Selectivity, Cash

Buy securities if available at attractive prices. Sell when securities no longer cheap. Go to cash when no opportunities are available.

We’ve discussed the concept of selectivity standards in the past, and whether these standards shift in different market environments. For Klarman, it would seem his selectivity standards remained absolute regardless of market environment.

Hedging

Baupost will always hedge against catastrophic or sustained downward movement in the market. This can be expensive over time, but will persist and remains part of investment strategy.

Klarman embedded hedging as an integrated “process” that’s part of the overall investment strategy. This way, Baupost is more likely to continue buying hedges even after years of premium bleed. This also avoids “giving up” just as disaster is about to hit. For more on this topic, be sure to check out the AQR tail risk hedging piece we showcased a few months ago.